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WHY SUPERMAJORITARIANISM DOES NOT
ILLUMINATE THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATE
BETWEEN ORIGINALISTS AND NONORIGINALISTS'
Ethan J. Leib*

INTRODUCTION

John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have done much over the last
decade to draw our attention to supermajoritarian rules in our constitutional
and political culture and to explain their desirability on a number of registers.' The lessons they have taught have broad application to an array of interesting debates in constitutional law and political theory.2 But now they
have gone too far. In A PragmaticDefense of Originalism,they seek to explain why supermajoritarianism furnishes a new pragmatic defense of
originalism.3 This most recent piece of their project simply does not work:
none of their major theses does anything to clarify the ongoing debate about
whether the Constitution of the United States should be interpreted primarily in light of its original meaning or whether other modes of interpretation
t This Essay was previously published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on
March 5, 2007, as Ethan J. Leib, Why SupermajoritarianismDoes Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 113 (2007),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/7/.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California-Hastings College of the Law.
Thanks to
Mark Spottswood for helpful engagement on the arguments developed here.
I See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
SupermajoritarianConstitution, 80 TEx. L. REV. 703 (2002) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Our
SupermajoritarianConstitution];John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
ConstitutionalSolution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionalityof Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483
(1995).
2 Indeed, in a recent article, I draw inspiration from their work and apply many of their insights to
argue for supermajoritarian decision rules in the context of criminal jury convictions, an underexplored
application of their enthusiasm for supermajoritarian rules in democratic decisionmaking. See generally
Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianismand the American Criminal Jury, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141
(2006) (arguing that McGinnis and Rappaport's attention to the supermajoritarian nature of our polity
helps recommend supermajoritarian decision rules for conviction by the criminal jury).
3 See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A PragmaticDefense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U.
L. REV. 383 (2007), 101 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 68 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2007/l/ (subsequent citations refer to 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383 (2007)).
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are better suited to the task. In this Essay, I dispute each of their substantive claims.
First, I argue that there is nothing newly pragmatic about their defense.
Although they claim to want to make originalists and pragmatists friends,'
nothing about their project is likely to accomplish this matchmaking. Second, I argue that there is no reason to believe that constitutional entrenchments produced under supermajoritarian decision rules are any more
desirable as a general matter than rules produced under other, more relaxed,
decision rules. At the core of their argument is the claim that the procedures of supermajoritarian entrenchment will achieve desirable constitutional provisions and results; I contest this proposition. Finally, I argue that
nothing about provisions subject to supermajoritarian agreement justifies,
without more substantial argument, an originalist interpretative regime. In
the final analysis, supermajoritarianism notwithstanding, we are left to debate the merits of originalism on the same terms as before McGinnis and
Rappaport's current intervention.
It may very well be that our Constitution is a great and desirable
document,5 but nothing about its supermajoritarian genesis necessarily
makes it so or requires us to follow only its original meaning.
I.

WHY THERE IS NOTHING NEWLY PRAGMATIC ABOUT McGiNNIs
AND RAPPAPORT'S ORIGINALISM

McGinnis and Rappaport begin their discussion by aiming to show
how pragmatists can embrace originalism because, under their rationale for
originalism, it is likely to produce good consequences overall.6 This argument is not a new gambit for originalists-and it goes nowhere, in any case.
As McGinnis and Rappaport readily concede, there have always been
originalists who have offered accounts of their interpretive methodology
that emphasize the good systemic consequences originalism may produce.7
Indeed, their Essay spells out a few of these well-known efforts: different
originalists have proffered the benefits of the rule of law, more legitimate
democracy, more stability, less judicial discretion, and less partisan interpretation as good results that may accrue from embracing originalism.'
Although McGinnis and Rappaport quickly and efficiently dismiss
each of these attempts to align originalism with good results,9 they fail to
4

Id. at 383.

5 But see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2002)

(providing a trenchant criticism of the entire document and many of its institutional choices); SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:

WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND

How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (same).
6 McGinnis & Rappaport, supranote 3, at 383.

7Id.
8Id.
9 Id. at 384.
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understand, more fundamentally, why some pragmatists have always refused to be moved by these originalist prognostications. It isn't simply that
pragmatists just need a more convincing set of good results likely to follow
from originalism to stimulate their conversion. Rather, there are more central reasons they can't join the originalist fray, ones McGinnis and Rappaport anticipate but fail to develop.
In short, there is a difference between what one might call "rulepragmatism" and what McGinnis and Rappaport call in a footnote "case-bycase pragmatism."'" Rule-pragmatists are looking for interpretive rules that,
over an entire legal system, will produce the best results and generate the
best systemic consequences. Rule-pragmatism takes a global view and
doesn't muddy itself in the micro-level decisions that emanate from the application of the rule to particular cases. Case-by-case pragmatists, by contrast, have already settled on an interpretive rule: judges must "focus on the
practical consequences of their decisions"" in the "here and now."' 2 This
latter form of pragmatism is simply not amenable to the formalism that
originalism requires3-and it is only the latter case-by-case pragmatists that
seem to be the central targets of McGinnis and Rappaport's argument.
As McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge, there are many originalists
who embrace originalism from the perspective of rule-pragmatism. 4
Originalism is routinely defended because of the systemic benefits it might
afford to the rule of law, democracy, and predictability-and the way in
which it constrains judicial discretion. But case-by-case legal pragmatists
are "forward-looking" and reject originalism at its core; they simply cannot
be convinced to embrace originalism because they do not think the past can
be given power over the present and because they are deeply skeptical
"about the methods by which lawyers build bridges from the past to the present.""5 No talk of abstract consequences can lure them to originalism because case-by-case pragmatists deny that good consequences in the "here
and now" can follow from giving the past so much authority. Ultimately,
case-by-case pragmatists think that originalism can never be determinate
and, in any case, is "inadequate to resolve genuinely novel legal issues."' 6
If that's right, nothing McGinnis and Rappaport have to say could win over
case-by-case pragmatists as friends. To make the marriage work, McGinnis
and Rappaport's originalism would need to be far more determinate and
'o Id. at 391 n.37.
II Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 90 (2005).
12 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 71 (2003) (emphasis added).
13 See id. at 59 ("Only in exceptional circumstances ... will the pragmatic judge give controlling
weight to systematic consequences, as legal formalism does; that is, only rarely will legal formalism be a
pragmatic strategy. And sometimes case-specific circumstances will completely dominate the decisional
process.").
14 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 384.
15 POSNER, supra note 12, at 71.
16 Id. at 72; see generally id. at 71-73.
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would need to make a much more substantial effort to show how today's
problems can be solved with solutions from two hundred years ago.
Thus, by running together two types of pragmatism, McGinnis and
Rappaport fail to see that adding some further reasons for rule-pragmatists
to embrace originalism gains them no real advantage against the type of
pragmatists--case-by-case pragmatists like Richard Posner-whom they
are self-consciously seeking to convince."
II. WHY SUPERMAJORITARIAN DECISION-MAKING CANNOT BE THE
SOURCE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION

Even if McGinnis and Rappaport are right that their argument helpfully
addresses the interpretive concerns of pragmatists, their major premise that
supermajoritarian decision rules are the source of the "beneficence of the
Constitution"'8 is not persuasive. There are two central problems with
McGinnis and Rappaport's attempt to show that supermajorities produce
good results and that supermajoritarianism is what confers especial legitimacy on the Constitution. First, there is no general theory of decision rules
that could confirm that the consequences that would flow from following
norms entrenched by supermajority rule in 1787 would be any better than
the consequences that would flow from following norms entrenched by
looser majoritarian rules in 2007. Context is everything. Second, and relatedly, there is substantial reason to doubt that the Constitution enjoys any
privileged status on account of its supermajoritarian genesis; many other
forms of lawmaking in our polity are supermajoritarian, and McGinnis and
Rappaport do not explain why laws enacted using those supermajoritarian
processes cannot displace the earlier supermajoritarian achievements of the
Constitution's enactment. In any case, those achievements are themselves
more complicated supermajoritarian moments than McGinnis and Rappaport seem ready to admit.
A. Context is Everything
The practical consequences of a decision rule cannot be assessed without attention to the context in which that decision rule operates. For example, suppose we ask which decision rule-supermajoritarianism in 1787 or
majoritarianism in 2007-would achieve the best results in achieving rules
to entrench the practice of research in medical science for the future. Almost no sane person would choose the former. Suppose, instead, we ask
17 Of course, not all rule-pragmatists are originalists, and McGinnis and Rappaport might convince

a few such rule-pragmatists to join them. But I would imagine that the rule-pragmatists would want to
hear a lot more about exactly which sorts of good consequences originalism can achieve. In any case, as
I think even McGinnis and Rappaport would agree, rule-pragmatists have not, as a group, been opposed
to originalism in the way case-by-case pragmatists have. Accordingly, the need for matchmaking between originalists and rule-pragmatists hardly seems like a pressing academic concern.
18 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 389-90.
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which decision rule should be used to settle debates about race by entrenching norms for the foreseeable future. Again, it is hard to see the consequentialist benefit of choosing supermajoritarianism in 1787, even if we are
prepared to agree that supermajoritarianism in 2007 could produce better
results than mere majoritarianism in 2007."9 The choice of decision rule is
very context-sensitive, where context is understood temporally.
But context is important even if we ignore temporal specificity in how
we frame the question because the subject matter to which a decision rule
will apply has a significant effect on the optimality of the chosen decision
rule as well. Adrian Vermeule, for example, highlights that submajority
rules-or superminoritarian decision rules-are especially useful for
agenda-setting (like the famous "Rule of Four" allowing four of nine Supreme Court justices to grant a writ of certiorari or the rules of direct democracy that allow a small minority of citizens to get a ballot initiative
considered by the whole electorate) and as an accountability-forcing
19 McGinnis and Rappaport's justifications for binding blacks and women to the Constitutiondespite their exclusion from the supermajoritarian rules that purportedly legitimized the Constitution itself-are extremely weak. See id. at 394-96.
It suffices to say that given McGinnis and Rappaport's focus on constitutional enactment as the primaryjustificatory moment, it is a bit of a cheat to smuggle in a justification for the document that arises
only because later provisions somehow purify the original enactment of its defects. More ironic is that
the full purification happens neither according to the very Article VII supermajority requirements that
they think give the Constitution its supermajoritarian credibility, see id. at 388, nor according to Article
V's supermajority requirements for constitutional amendment. Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport find it
relevant for the Constitution's legitimacy, for example, that blacks are now equal, thanks to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and that women are now equal thanks to the Supreme Court's construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 395-96. It turns out that plain-old legislation and "judicial activism"--processes that are rather different from the supermajoritarian processes that rest at the center of
the Constitution's legitimacy for McGinnis and Rappaport-legitimize the Constitution itself. Just how
these post-enactment moments work to cleanse the original sin of exclusion retroactively is not well
specified in their essay.
Moreover, their suggestion that we ought to worry about the exclusion of women from the founding
supermajoritarian big bang of beneficence less than the exclusion of blacks therefrom is unsupported by
authority and borders on the offensive: they claim that "women were virtually represented at the time
by their male relatives" and that "many women apparently believed that they should not have the right to
participate." Id. at 395 (citing no authority).
Finally, in their discussion of exclusions, McGinnis and Rappaport evade one of the most interesting
interventions in the voting rule literature, one that presents yet another challenge to their project. See
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 103, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=791724. Vermeule argues, "To say that
the voting rule should be 'a majority' or 'a supermajority' is an underspecified statement, like saying 'X
is more than' or 'three multiplied by.' If a voting rule is to be coherently stated, one must ask 'a majority (or supermajority) of what?'
Id. at 3. In particular, Vermeule demands that those favoring "supermajoritarian" rules specify their preferred "multiplicand," which is usually either a supermajority of "(1)
those piesent and voting or (2) the whole membership of the institution .
I..."
ld. at 4. As Vermeule's
paper makes clear, the choice can be quite consequential-and McGinnis and Rappaport simply do not
engage the question of the appropriate multiplicand, which is central to their claim that supermajoritarianism itself confers legitimacy despite great exclusions from the moment of enactment. Thanks to Seth
Barrett Tillman for discussion on this last point.
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mechanism (like the so-called "Journal Clause,"2 which allows a small set
of legislators to demand a roll-call vote in the House or Senate, or House
Rule XI, which allows a small group of committee members to call witnesses at hearings)." Thus, depending on the type of decision at issue, a
decision rule that requires only a superminority of the population to agree
may be sufficient for "good" results. It all depends on what one is trying to
accomplish-and nothing guarantees that supermajority rules will produce
the right results in all contexts.2"
Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport have the burden to show that constitutional provisions in particular will be better when they are subject to supermajoritarian decision rules. Yet even for this potentially plausible claim,
there are several basic counterarguments (beyond the temporal difficulty)
that they barely confront. There are a series of criticisms of supermajority
rules that apply with substantial force, even in the very context in which
McGinnis and Rappaport apply them.23 These difficulties with supermajoritarianism at least suggest that we cannot be guaranteed good results simply
by embracing a supermajoritarian decision rule. Let me elaborate upon two
specific criticisms of supermajoritarian decision rules and how they undermine McGinnis and Rappaport's argument.
First, supermajoritarian rules are widely criticized as potentially tending to privilege the status quo. Assuming that we want to live in a democratic society where self-governance is a paramount political end, decision
§ 5, cl.3.
21 See Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I,

PHIL. 74 (2005).
22 Of course, McGinnis and Rappaport already know all this. In their earlier articles on supermajoritarianism, they develop a much more nuanced approach to supermajoritarianism-one that acknowledges that supermajoritarian benefits accrue only in particular contexts. See, e.g., McGinnis &
Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, supranote 1, at 728.
23 Elsewhere, I have catalogued critiques routinely offered against supermajority rule, ones that find
no rebuttal in McGinnis and Rappaport's essay, despite their potential application to the particular context of Constitution-making. Supermajoritarian decision rules for constitutional choices can:
- result[] in compromises no one really wants because ideas and policies get thinned out to garner
substantial agreement[;]
*privilege[] the status quo ... [;]
* [fail to] result in higher likelihood of "correct" answers because just as the probability of correct
decision[s] increases with move[s] toward unanimity [away from simple majority rule], so does
the probability that the minority is wrong increase; accordingly, providing the minority veto power
may be unwise[;]
* [lead to] coalition-building [that] reifies groups and can be balkanizing[;]
* [be] no better than simple majority at avoiding Condorcet losers (i.e., choices that might win in a
ranking system but that would fail in pair-wise competition with other choices).
Leib, supra note 2, at 153-54.
24 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 140-41 (1989); Amy Gutmann, Deliberative Democracy and Majority Rule: Reply to Waldron, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & HUMAN
RIGHTS 227, 230 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) ("To give a minority veto power is
morally more dangerous in the legislative arena than it is in criminal trials ....
").
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rules that privilege the status quo should be counter-indicated. One could,
to be sure, avoid this critique if the status quo were always acceptable and if
"attractive baselines" were the background from which supermajoritarian
rules constrain change. 25 This is, after all, the gambit of constitutional democracy.
However, it is not clear if such a defense can be mounted of the supermajoritarian process that produced the Constitution itself-the very focus of
McGinnis and Rappaport's argument about its beneficence. Failure to
achieve agreement on the Constitution would probably have left the states
stuck with the Articles of Confederation--or (worse?) no Union at all.
Given McGinnis and Rappaport's encomium to the goodness of the Constitution, they would not likely consider the failure to agree on its provisions
an attractive baseline. Given that the status quo at the time of ratification
wasn't very good, supermajoritarian rules were potentially suboptimal in
the very moment of regime formation that is so central to McGinnis and
Rappaport's argument.
Second, supermajoritarian rules can be problematic when the members
of the supermajority differ from the superminority or from those to be governed in important respects. Again, here, more context would be helpful in
ascertaining the appropriate decision rule: if a supermajority of constitutional enactors or ratifiers were, say, white property owners with a soft spot
for God, perhaps many of the purported benefits of deliberation and coalition-building that supermajoritarian rules are supposed to provide would
fail to work their magic on constitutional questions related to race, property,
and God. Thus, we must know more about who, specifically, is making a
given decision and what, specifically, he or she is making that decision
about to be able to assess whether the virtues of a particular decision rule
accrue to a decisional context.26 These details remain underdeveloped by
McGinnis and Rappaport.
B. PrivilegingSupermajoritarianDecision Rules Does Not Necessarily
Give the ConstitutionAny Special Status in Our Constellationof Legal
Authority
There are a series of difficulties associated with McGinnis and Rappaport's effort to confer upon the Constitution especial legitimacy owing to its
supermajoritarian genesis. In short, the Constitution's enactment proce25 The "attractive baselines" argument is developed in McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 1, at 742.

26 See Gutmann, supra note 24, at 230 ("The likelihood of achieving justifiable agreement [with supermajority rules] differs depending on what the issue is and who the deliberators are."). In my recent
article that aims to apply McGinnis and Rappaport's insights to jury decision rules, context-sensitivity
led me to embrace supermajoritarian rules for conviction by the criminal jury but to reject them for acquittal. The same considerations do not apply to the decision to acquit, so I don't think it is appropriate
to require jurors to reach consensus on acquittal beyond simple majority agreement. See Leib, supra
note 2, at 187-88.
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dures may not be as supermajoritarian as they assume-and they may not
be particularly distinctive, as compared with other supermajoritarian forms
of lawmaking in our polity.
Granted, the original Constitution could be enacted only through Article VII, which required that ratification be effected in nine states. From one
perspective, one cannot deny that this is a supermajoritarian hurdle. 7 Yet
by focusing upon a different aspect of enactment, one can see how unstable
this evidence of supermajoritarianism is: instead, we might reasonably focus upon the decision rule that controlled the ratification process in the nine
states. It turns out that the decision rule operating in that part of the enactment process was not really supermajoritarian. Consider Akhil Amar's
analysis of Article VII:
[T]he key voting rule in Article VII is simple majority rule, and not supermajority rule, as might be inferred from a too casual glance at its seeming 9/13
voting rule. The focus on 9/13 is misleading. To begin with, this is not a true
voting rule at all, since the four dissenting states would not be bound by the
nine affirmative states. The true voting rule occurs within each state, where a
simple majority did bind dissenters. Given that each state was sovereign prior
to ratifying the Constitution, the place to look for the key voting rule is within
each state, where a simple majority of the sovereign people did alter or abolish
their pre-existing constitution. The 9/13 provision is thus best understood as a
substantive condition subsequent, modifying what, precisely, the people of
each state were voting for: a new constitution if and only if eight other states
agreed, so that the new scheme could achieve a workable critical mass.28
When looked at through this lens, it is hard to put so much weight on
supermajoritarian decision rules at the time of enactment-for they are not
consistently applied to the procedures of enactment.
A similar problem surfaces in the amendment provisions in Article V.
Although ratification of amendments requires consent of three-fourths of
the states (whether through state conventions or state legislatures), the federal Constitution itself does not require any supermajoritarian constraint
within the statewide
decisionmaking
process." In McGinnis
sum, it can't
supermajoritarianism
itself that
confers legitimacy-and
andbeRappaport

27 Indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport want us to believe that this was a double supermajoritarian hurdle because "a supermajority of states also had to support the Constitutional Convention in the first
place." McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 388-89.
28 Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 487 n.1 12 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
29 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the DenominatorProblem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 774 (1994) ("Most remarkable
is what was not said in antebellum debates. Almost no one denied that ... the proper voting rule for
popular sovereignty in making or changing constitutions is simple majority rule. Almost no one, for example, argued that conventions orpopular ratificationmust be supermajoritarian.").
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seem 3to
care about only one aspect of the enactment and amendment proc0
esses.
Yet suppose supermajority rule did, in fact, confer some special democratic legitimacy on rules that pass through such a difficult hurdle. If
that were the case, why shouldn't all laws that command widespread
agreement be entitled to the same kind of deference constitutional provisions get under McGinnis and Rappaport's theory? Indeed, all laws partake
of the form of norm entrenchment-and many of our most important laws
enjoyed some kind of supermajoritarian agreement. For example, the Civil
Rights Act of 196431 passed the House by a vote of 289 to 126 (a near 70%32
supermajority) and the Senate by a vote of 73 to 27 (a 73% supermajority).
The norms the Act embodies have achieved widespread consensus and entrench antidiscrimination norms throughout our polity. Is there any reason
that such a law should receive any less deference or respect than constitutional provisions from the perspective of supermajoritarianism? Indeed, if
two supermajoritarian enactments conflict, why shouldn't the last in time
control? As I show below, it is not enough to say that statutes, unlike constitutional provisions, are effectively capable of repeal by mere majorities;
in any case, if supermajoritarian genesis is the linchpin, as it often seems to
be for McGinnis and Rappaport, nothing about the possibility of repeal can
undermine the extra legitimacy supermajoritarian consensus should be able
to afford.
There are bigger headaches for McGinnis and Rappaport to confront
even if we grant them that supermajoritarianism confers especial legitimacy. As they themselves emphasize in their 2002 article, what we think of
as our standard "majoritarian" legislative process in the United States is actually supermajoritarian in a meaningful sense: Bicameralism and presentment are themselves forms of supermajoritarianism that depart from pure
majoritarianism.33 Thus, even the attempt to distinguish constitutional provisions from "mere" statutes based on the deeper entrenchment and difficulty of repeal associated with constitutional provisions is suspect: both
30 They might reply that national supermajorities would likely still be necessary to achieve the Article VII and Article V thresholds. Perhaps-but perhaps not. Nothing in the enactment and amendment
rules requires it, and the differences between small population states and large population states is not
merely a modem anomaly.
31 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (2000)).
32 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

22-23 (3d ed. 2001).

33 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, supra note 1, at 712-16
(citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-48 (1962));
DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 193-95 (1996); John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2001); William T. Mayton, The Possibilitiesof
Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956 (1986); see also Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct De-

mocracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1557 (1990) ("Bicameralism forces majorities to seek broader coalitions.
It imposes something like a supermajoritarian voting rule.").
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types of laws are entrenched and cannot be repealed without commanding a
supermajority. It is not enough to say that one is more supermajoritarian
than another, for it needn't always be true. A statute passed unanimously is
still only a statute. In any event, McGinnis and Rappaport do not furnish us
with any sliding scale that would enable us to rank how much respect to afford a legal enactment based on the degree of consensus it commands.
What this means for McGinnis and Rappaport is that they need a more
careful definition of the kind of supermajority rules that give enactments
their special character.34 If all legislation is supermajoritarian, why should
the mere ability to convince nine states (using internally majoritarian processes and allowing the ultimate exclusion of those states who failed to ratify) in 1787 command any special deference or legitimacy?35 If the
procedure of supermajoritarianism is what ensures good results, it is far
from clear why we should limit our vigorous and strict enforcement of supermajoritarian norms to the Constitution itself.

III. WHY SUPERMAJORITARIANISM DOES NOT REQUIRE AN
ORIGINALIST INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY

The final piece of McGinnis and Rappaport's argument is similarly unavailing. The core of this part of their argument is that since agreement
upon the original meaning of the text was ostensibly necessary to pass
through the supermajoritarian threshold for enactment, future interpreters
must limit themselves to that meaning to pay respect to the very source of
the Constitution's beneficence.36 This argument does not succeed for a
number of reasons.
In the first place, McGinnis and Rappaport claim that all interpretation
of the Constitution's provisions (ambiguous and otherwise) must be guided
by "interpretative rules with which [the drafters and ratifiers] were familiar."" This argument is predicated on McGinnis and Rappaport's belief that
the drafters' and ratifiers' interpretive conventions are binding and conform
to original meaning originalism. Yet it is not at all clear why the founding
generation's interpretive conventions are necessarily binding or that they
were originalist in the style of original meaning originalism.
McGinnis and Rappaport's claim relies on controversial assumptions
34 This is similar to the challenge supermajoritarians often hear: "Any theory that might justify the

use of a three-fifths (60%) or two-thirds (66.6%) decision rule should be equally effective at justifying a
nine-tenths (90%) decision rule, or even the rule of a single person (99.9999%)." Brett W. King, Wild
Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 609, 611 (2000).

35 Arguably, the procedures of standard legislation might often be more supermajoritarian than constitutional provisions because bills may be subject to Senate Rule V, requiring unanimous consent of all
Senators to achieve consideration on the floor of the Senate chamber. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note
32, at 32 (explaining how Senate Rule V operates as a supermajoritarian vetogate).
36 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 389-91.

37 Id. at 389.
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about what "the drafters and ratifiers" believed-and it seems to be their
burden to show us just what interpretive conventions the framers shared.
They do not meet their burden, leaving us wondering whether those players,
by contrast, might have understood that the enterprise of drafting a Constitution to endure for the ages could very well lead to open-textured or ambiguous provisions being subjected to interpretive conventions they could
not yet anticipate. Since it was a Constitution they were establishing, they
might have understood that a prolix code would have been inappropriate
and that it would be for future generations to expound upon the very vague
and general aspirations announced in the document.38
Or, perhaps the drafters and ratifiers chose ambiguous terms in various
places as a form of delegation to future generations.3 9 Legislators routinely
fail to agree on the definition of a core term in a statute, leaving substantial
holes in their enactments; 40 sometimes they can be, or must be, presumed to

38 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("A constitution, to contain an ac-

curate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which
they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.
That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.").
39 Certainly, some ratifiers were all too aware that deep ambiguities in the document seemed to give
free rein to future federal authorities to do whatever they wanted. Despite this awareness, they voted to
ratify. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,
912 n. 143 (1985) (explaining the views of Edmund Randolph, a delegate in Philadelphia, who ultimately
played an important role in getting Virginia to ratify the document despite his misgivings about serious
vagueness and ambiguity injurious to the states). This evidence suggests that some drafters and ratifiers
might have recognized that the Constitution would not be fully interpreted in light of contemporaneous
interpretive conventions. And there is much more evidence in Powell's article that tends to show that
many Anti-Federalists were deeply concerned about the radical interpretive freedom the Constitution
gave to future Congresses and members of the federal judiciary. The views of these important members
of the founding generation are surely relevant in ascertaining the interpretive conventions prevalent at
the time of enactment and how they were expected to be applied to the Constitution's open-textured and
ambiguous provisions.
40 Consider, for example, Congress's "failure" to define the term "discriminate" in the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 239-43 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting Congress's failure to define the word "discriminate" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and trying to derive its meaning not from the statute directly
but from legislative history). Gaps in legal text virtually guarantee that the judicial function and judicial
power will require more than simple law-application. See, e.g., Rex v. Liggetts-Findley Drug-Stores
Ltd., [1919] 3 W.W.R. 1025 (rejecting an argument that because a statute required drug shops to close
by 10 P.M., but did not specify that they must remain closed for any period of time, the statute thus left
open the possibility that the shop owner could reopen at 10:10 P.M.); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 32, at 100 ("Can we expect Congress, drafting statutory language in an environment of imperfect
information and substantial time pressure, to anticipate specific questions that will arise under the law,
or is it more realistic to expect general statements of policy that will require agencies and courts to use
discretion in executing and interpreting law?").

1915

HeinOnline -- 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1915 2007

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

delegate the interpretation of such ambiguities to agencies and courts.' In
any case, it continues to remain unclear how supermajoritarianism, in particular, illuminates this age-old debate between originalists and nonoriginalists.
Indeed, in a more recent work, McGinnis and Rappaport openly acknowledge that their account of original interpretive conventions has not
been "fully developed."42 In fact, they offer virtually no authority for, or
systematic investigation into, how we might come to know the content of
the framers' and ratifiers' interpretive conventions. 3 Given this underdevelopment, it is most difficult to embrace their claims about all the good
consequences that will flow from their originalist methodology when they
can't even give us a most basic sense of the actual results their technique
would produce.
Of course, it is perfectly plausible, in theory, to imagine that we might
someday be able to divine an exhaustive list of the drafters' and ratifiers'
interpretive conventions. Still, in practice, there is reason to be skeptical
about the prospect because we are bound to run into aggregation problems.
Supposing that the founding generation did not unanimously share interpretive conventions,44 which rules help us decide among divergent ones? If
Framer A is an original meaning textualist, Ratifier B is a purposivist that
thinks all ambiguities should be resolved with recourse to the most general
principles in the Preamble, and Drafter C likes a form of dynamic interpretation, how do we aggregate these interpretive preferences into a coherent
set of "originalist" interpretive principles? Must an interpretive convention
command a supermajority? To the extent that we have evidence of the
founding generation's interpretive conventions, we have some evidence of
41 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 572 (citing HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS,
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147, 362-403,
545-70 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) for the proposition that legislatures someTHE LEGAL PROCESS:

times need to enact very broadly worded standards rather than specific rules, and that enacting ambiguous or vague provisions "essentially delegat[es] rulemaking responsibilities to courts [and] agencies").
42 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMEN. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 9), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-962142.
43 In this more recent work, McGinnis and Rappaport cite Powell to instruct us on the interpretive
conventions of the founding generation. Id. at 8 (citing Powell, supra note 39). And Powell at least
provides McGinnis and Rappaport some useful support when he announces: "Although the Philadelphia
framers did not discuss in detail how they intended their end product to be interpreted, they clearly assumed that future interpreters would adhere to then-prevalent methods of statutory construction." Powell, supra note 39, at 904. Moreover, there is much material in Powell that dovetails neatly with

McGinnis and Rappaport's sympathy for original meaning originalism (though the evidence is far from
univocal on the question). However, even if these excavations are historically accurate, McGinnis and
Rappaport still need an argument for why any of this history should matter. And supermajoritarianism

cannot fill that gap.
44 As Powell argues, at the time of the enactment of the Constitution, "there were sharp disagreements over which interpretive approach was acceptable." Powell, supra note 39, at912.
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an original public meaning approach to interpretation45 and a more eclectic
approach to reading legal texts.46 The business of synthesizing all this evidence into a neat package of originalist interpretive conventions remains
undone.
Indeed, even if we had clear and univocal authority on the framers' and
ratifiers' interpretive conventions, it remains true that nothing about supermajoritarianism requires us to respect them. On the contrary, there is an
equally plausible argument that supermajoritarian agreement should lead to
dynamic rather than originalist interpretation. This is, perhaps, one lesson
of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn's provocative essay on "superstatutes"-statutes that command widespread acceptance over time and become part of our fundamental law as quasi-constitutional norms.47 "Superstatutes" need not achieve formal Article V supermajoritarian agreement, of
course, but are similarly legitimated based upon the deliberation-enhancing
qualities of broad agreement over time.48
And what do Eskridge and Ferejohn have to say about the sorts of interpretive methods that are appropriate for such "supermajoritarian" forms
of lawmaking? In the first instance, they clearly show that, as a descriptive
matter, courts tend not to approach such legal imperatives in an originalist
fashion.49 This indicates, perhaps, that we have a well-entrenched practice
of treating high-consensus laws as particularly apt for dynamic interpretation: "[A] super-statute will generally be applied in a purposive rather than
simple text-bounded or originalist way. It will generate a dynamic common
law implementing its great principle and adapting the statute to meet the
challenges posed to that principle by a complex society." 5
But there is also a normative dimension to the practice of treating supermajoritarian laws with non-originalist tools. The "supermajoritarian"
genesis of these laws that achieve widespread acceptance is part of the very
reason they command dynamic and non-originalist interpretation in the
courts. That is, precisely because agreement about such basic entrenchments is meant to endure for the ages and adapt to new circumstances,
originalism is inappropriate. To be sure, widespread agreement is often
45 Id.

46 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 671-73 (summarizing the founding generation's eclectic
approach to statutory interpretation, which included considerations of "equity"); see also Powell, supra

note 39, at 887 (suggesting that the interpretive conventions of some of the drafters and ratifiers of the
Constitution evidenced a "willingness to interpret the constitutional text in accordance with the common
law principles that had been used to construe statutes").
47 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215
(2001) (developing the idea of a super-statute that wins broad consensus and commands dynamic, rather
than originalist, interpretation in the courts).
48 Id. at 1271 (arguing that the entrenched norms of super-statutes "form under conditions of consensus" and require "a continuing process of deliberation" and "consensus-building").
49 Id. at 1234.
50 Id.
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only possible at such high levels of generality, and that helps explain why
those agreeing to highly abstract principles would themselves embrace dynamic interpretation; originalism's formalism would betray the broad norms
that are supposed to be applied in the future to novel legal problems.5
Eskridge and Ferejohn enable us to see that supermajoritarianism can be
used to defend non-originalist modes of interpretation as well.
Of course, McGinnis and Rappaport can disagree and continue to insist
that all supermajoritarian lawmaking should be susceptible only to originalist interpretation. I have offered no especially good reason to prefer
Eskridge and Ferejohn to McGinnis and Rappaport. But neither McGinnis
and Rappaport's reliance on original expectations about interpretative conventions nor their reliance solely on supermajoritarianism itself neatly produces their conclusions. They still have to engage in the same debates
constitutional theorists have been having for ages about originalism and
non-originalism.
CONCLUSION

McGinnis and Rappaport have made multiple contributions to many
important legal and political debates with their careful attention to the design and desirability of supermajoritarian rules in our practices of selfgovernment. There is no doubt that they will continue to illuminate many
questions of institutional design in our polity with their ongoing and sustained attention to the most fundamental issue of the choice of appropriate
decision rules in democratic decisionmaking. But their most recent effort is
unpersuasive. They have not really shown how supermajoritarianism helps
illuminate the interpretive debate between originalists and non-originalists;
why it will make originalists and pragmatists friends; or what about it,
standing alone, gives us any special insight into the desirability and legitimacy of the Constitution.

51 Another interesting aspect of Eskridge and Ferejohn's essay is their claim that super-statutes will
have a "gravitational pull on constitutional law itself" Id. at 1232, 1236. This highlights the challenge I
offered earlier in this Essay: supermajoritarianism's legitimating force (if indeed it does do something
to confer legitimacy) cannot be isolated to constitutional enactment and Article V amendment. Rather,
our society will come to agreement and deliberative consensus on new principles that themselves will
have special legitimacy. And these new equilibria should have and do have effects on the interpretation
of the Constitution itself. Id. at 1267-76. This tends to show that a thoroughgoing commitment to supermajoritarianism does not rest well with originalism. If McGinnis and Rappaport want us to be
originalists, supermajoritarianism surely doesn't get us there directly.

1918

HeinOnline -- 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1918 2007

